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Claude Skills by NoorQureshi
github.com/NoorQureshi206 skills0 installs21 views
- Ad AdcsAttack Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) — ESC1–ESC8 template/CA misconfigurations to escalate to Domain Admin. Load with a domain foothold/creds where ADCS is present, on "certipy", "ESC1", "certificate template", or a CA server. Signals: Cert Publishers, pKIEnrollmentService, ports 443/135 on a CA, certipy find output.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Ad Dacl AbuseAbuse Active Directory object ACLs/DACLs for lateral movement and escalation — GenericAll, WriteDACL, GenericWrite, WriteOwner, AddMember, ForceChangePassword, and DCSync rights. Load with domain creds + BloodHound showing an ACL edge, on "GenericAll", "WriteDACL", "DCSync", "abuse this edge".Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Ad Delegation AbuseAbuse Kerberos delegation to impersonate users and take over hosts — unconstrained, constrained (S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy), and resource-based (RBCD), including the coercion → NTLM-relay-to-LDAP → RBCD chain. Load in an AD environment when BloodHound/enum shows delegation rights, a machine account you control, GenericWrite/GenericAll over a computer, or coercion is possible. Signals: msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity, TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION, msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo, PetitPotam.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Ad KerberoastingKerberoasting & AS-REP roasting — request/crack Kerberos tickets to recover service/user passwords offline. Load with any domain foothold or valid domain creds, on "kerberoast", "AS-REP", SPNs, service accounts, ports 88/389. Signals: domain creds in hand, SPNs set, accounts with pre-auth disabled.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Ad Pivot ArsenalOne line: Active Directory, pivoting/tunneling, and password-cracking arsenal for authorized engagements. Trigger signals: "Active Directory", "domain", "kerberos", "kerberoast", "AS-REP", "BloodHound", "DCSync", "AD/.local domain", holding domain creds or a foothold. Authorized, in-scope targets only.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Ai Agent Tool AbuseAbuse an LLM agent's tools/functions — coerce it to call tools with attacker-chosen args for SSRF, RCE, data exfil, or privilege abuse. Load when the target is an agent with tools/ function-calling/plugins, MCP servers, code interpreters, or "the assistant can do X". Signals: function-calling, tool schemas, browse/email/query/exec tools, autonomous agents.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Ai Insecure Output HandlingExploit apps that trust LLM output — pass model text unsanitized into XSS sinks, SQL, shell, code, or downstream calls. Load when LLM output is rendered as HTML/markdown, executed, or fed to another system. Signals: chatbot output shown with innerHTML/dangerouslySetInnerHTML, "run this code", LLM-generated queries/commands, agent output used in eval/exec.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Ai JailbreakBypass an LLM's safety/guardrails to make it produce restricted output or ignore its policy. Load when testing an AI product's content controls, "jailbreak", "guardrail bypass", refusal testing, or safety evals. Signals: a chatbot/assistant with a usage policy, refusals to test, content filters.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Ai Llm DosUnbounded-consumption / denial-of-wallet attacks on LLM apps — force runaway tokens, cost, or latency. Load when testing an LLM product's limits/billing, on "LLM DoS", cost amplification, or resource exhaustion. Signals: user-controlled prompts/max_tokens, agent loops, no rate/'cost caps'.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Ai Mcp SecurityAssess Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers and agent tool integrations — tool poisoning, prompt injection via tool descriptions/results, over-broad scopes, and unauth tool exposure. Load when the target uses MCP servers, agent tool/function integrations, or connectors. Signals: mcp.json, MCP server, tool schemas, connector marketplace, agent with external tools.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Ai Model ExtractionExtract or steal an ML/LLM model's parameters, training data, or system prompt via query access — model stealing, membership inference, training-data extraction. Load when testing an ML API/endpoint, "model extraction/inversion", data-leakage or IP-theft concerns, exposed inference endpoints. Signals: a predict/inference API, embeddings endpoint, fine-tuned model.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Ai Prompt InjectionTest LLM-backed apps for prompt injection (direct + indirect) and its consequences: data exfil, tool/function abuse, guardrail bypass. Load when the target is a chatbot/assistant/ agent, summarizes untrusted content, has tools/functions, or does RAG. Signals: "ask AI", system prompts, function-calling, "summarize this URL/file", agentic actions.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Ai Rag PoisoningPoison a RAG/knowledge-base pipeline so retrieved content hijacks the model (indirect prompt injection at scale) or exfiltrates data. Load when the app does retrieval over documents/URLs/ tickets/emails the attacker can influence, "RAG", vector DB, "knowledge base", agent that reads content. Signals: upload-to-KB, "chat with your docs", crawled sources.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Ai Supply ChainAttack the ML/LLM supply chain — poisoned models, datasets, plugins, and unsafe model deserialization. Load when an app loads third-party models/weights (HuggingFace, .pt/.pkl/.h5), installs ML deps, uses plugins/extensions, or fine-tunes on external data. Signals: torch.load, pickle model files, model hub downloads, plugin marketplace, RAG over external corpora.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Api Auth AttacksBreak API authentication: token handling, key leakage, weak session/JWT, and no-auth endpoints. Load on REST/GraphQL APIs using API keys, Bearer tokens, HMAC signing, or basic auth. Signals: `Authorization` headers, api_key params, tokens in URLs, /v1 vs /v2 auth drift.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Api BolaBroken Object/Function Level Authorization in REST/JSON APIs (the #1 API risk). Load on any REST API with object ids in paths/bodies (/api/v1/users/123, /orders/{id}), Bearer auth, mobile-app backends, or admin vs user function separation. Signals: predictable ids, verbs that skip re-authorization, "role" enforced only in the UI.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Api FuzzingDiscover and fuzz API endpoints, methods, params, and versions systematically. Load when you have an API base but not its full surface, an OpenAPI/Swagger/Postman spec, or "map/fuzz the API". Signals: /api, /v1, swagger.json, GraphQL, mobile backend, undocumented routes.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Api GraphqlAttack GraphQL APIs. Load on /graphql, /graphiql, /v1/graphql, a POST with {"query":"..."}, Apollo/Hasura/graphene stacks, or "query/mutation" language. Signals: introspection enabled, batched queries, deeply nested fields, __schema, aliases.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Api GrpcTest gRPC / Protocol Buffers APIs — reflection, method enumeration, authz, and injection. Load on gRPC services (HTTP/2, content-type application/grpc, .proto files, ports like 50051), grpc-web, or "protobuf". Signals: grpc, protobuf, reflection service, ServerReflection.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Api Mass AssignmentMass assignment / auto-binding privilege escalation. Load when an API binds JSON directly to a model (Rails, Spring, Django REST, Node/Mongoose), on signup/profile-update/create endpoints, or when responses expose fields you didn't send (role, isAdmin, balance, verified). Signals: ORM object binding, extra fields accepted silently.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Api Mongo Agg Facet BypassBypass a MongoDB aggregation-pipeline stage allowlist by nesting disallowed read stages inside $facet, then $unionWith/$lookup sibling collections to exfiltrate secrets (invite tokens, creds, hashes). Load when: an endpoint accepts a user-supplied `pipeline` (or errors like "operator-form queries not accepted, use the pipeline parameter"), a Node/Express + MongoDB backend, 24-hex `_id`s, or an "advanced query" API. Authorized targets only.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Api Testing ChecklistA fast, ordered methodology for assessing an API end to end — REST/GraphQL/gRPC/SOAP — so nothing gets skipped. Load when the target is an API (or recon found one), on "test this API", "checklist", methodology triage, or to confirm coverage before reporting. Signals: /api, swagger/openapi.json, GraphQL /graphql, gRPC, JSON/XML endpoints, a mobile/SPA backend.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Api VersioningFind and attack old/shadow API versions that missed a fix — improper inventory management. Load when the API is versioned (/v1, /v2, /api/2021-01), on "old API", or after mapping the surface. Signals: version in path/header/subdomain, deprecated docs, mobile app using an older version.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Automation Nuclei TemplatesWrite custom nuclei templates to codify a finding into a repeatable, mass-scannable check. Load on "write a nuclei template", turning a manual bug into automation, checking a CVE across many hosts, or regression-scanning. Signals: a reproducible request→match, YAML templates, nuclei.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Automation Recon PipelineChain recon tools into a repeatable, resumable pipeline for continuous bug-bounty coverage. Load on "automate recon", "recon pipeline", monitoring many programs, or scaling subdomain→ live→scan. Signals: wildcard scope at scale, wanting scheduled/continuous discovery.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Cloud AzureAttack Azure / Entra ID — managed-identity token theft, Entra (Azure AD) role abuse, and app/ storage misconfig. Load when the target is on Azure, you hold Azure creds/a token, or see Entra/AAD/azurewebsites/blob.core.windows.net. Signals: 169.254.169.254 IMDS, Managed Identity, az cli, Entra roles, service principals.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Cloud Container EscapeBreak out of a container to the host. Load when you have a shell in a container/pod and want the node: privileged container, mounted docker.sock, dangerous capabilities, hostPath, or "escape the container". Signals: /.dockerenv, cgroup shows docker/k8s, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, mounted socket.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Cloud Docker Api AbuseTurn an exposed container daemon or an over-privileged container into host compromise — a Docker API on 2375/2376, a mounted docker.sock, or a privileged/`-v /:/host` container. Load when you find an open Docker/containerd socket, port 2375/2376, a container you can run images in, or you landed inside a container and want the host. Signals: 2375/tcp open, /var/run/docker.sock reachable, `docker` group membership, privileged container, host paths mounted in.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Cloud Docker RegistryFind and loot exposed container registries — image pull/push, secrets baked in layers, and registry misconfig. Load on exposed Docker registry (port 5000, /v2/), a registry URL, harbor/ECR/ GCR/ACR references, or "container registry". Signals: /v2/_catalog, registry:2, unauth pull/push.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Cloud GcpAttack Google Cloud Platform — metadata/SA token theft, IAM privilege escalation, and storage/ function misconfig. Load when the target runs on GCP, you hold a GCP SA key/token, or see gcp/gcloud/GCE/GKE/appspot. Signals: metadata.google.internal, service-account.json, storage.googleapis.com, cloudfunctions, gcloud.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Cloud Iam PrivescEscalate privileges in cloud IAM (AWS/GCP/Azure) from a low-priv set of credentials. Load when you hold cloud creds/keys/a role and want higher privilege or new resources. Signals: leaked AWS keys, an assumed role, a service-account token, "escalate in AWS/GCP/Azure", enumerated permissions.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Cloud Imds SsrfEscalate SSRF to cloud credential theft via the instance metadata service (IMDS). Load when SSRF is confirmed AND the target runs on AWS/GCP/Azure. Signals: 169.254.169.254 reachable, cloud-hosted app, SSRF that can set arbitrary Host/headers, "metadata".Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Cloud KubernetesAttack exposed Kubernetes: API server, kubelet, etcd, dashboards, and RBAC. Load on k8s signals — ports 6443/10250/2379/8443, /api/v1, kube-dns, a pod foothold, or "kubernetes/k8s". Signals: kubectl, service-account tokens, exposed dashboard, container in a cluster.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Cloud S3 ExposureFind and prove misconfigured cloud object storage (S3/GCS/Azure Blob). Load when assets load from *.s3.amazonaws.com, storage.googleapis.com, *.blob.core.windows.net, bucket-looking hostnames, or "bucket". Signals: public-read/list, unauthenticated writes, predictable bucket names.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Code Review CicdReview CI/CD pipelines for security flaws — poisoned workflows, secret leakage, and injection. Load on GitHub Actions / GitLab CI / Jenkins config, ".github/workflows", pull_request_target, self-hosted runners, or "pipeline security". Signals: workflow YAML, secrets in CI, third-party actions.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Code Review CppSecurity review of C / C++ code — memory-safety and the classic unsafe-API sinks. Load when reviewing C/C++ source/PR, on .c/.cc/.cpp/.h in scope, or "review this C code". Signals: Makefile/CMakeLists, strcpy/sprintf/memcpy, malloc/free, raw pointers, format strings, parsers.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Code Review Dangerous SinksGrep-ready dangerous function/sink catalog per language for fast code review. Load when reviewing source in PHP, Python, JavaScript/Node, Java, Ruby, Go, .NET/C# and you need the exact functions that cause RCE/SQLi/SSRF/traversal/deserialization. Signals: "dangerous functions", "sinks", grepping a codebase.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Code Review DotnetSecurity review of .NET / C# code — dangerous sinks and ASP.NET pitfalls. Load when reviewing a C#/.NET codebase/PR, on .cs source in scope, or "review this .NET app". Signals: .csproj/.sln, ASP.NET (Core/MVC/WebForms), BinaryFormatter, SqlCommand, Razor Html.Raw, XmlDocument.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Code Review GoSecurity review of Go code — dangerous sinks and web-framework pitfalls. Load when reviewing a Go codebase/PR, on .go source in scope, or "review this Go". Signals: go.mod, net/http, os/exec, text/template, database/sql, gin/echo/fiber.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Code Review IacSecurity review of infrastructure-as-code — Terraform, CloudFormation, Ansible, Kubernetes/Helm manifests. Load when reviewing IaC in a repo/PR, on .tf/.yaml/.yml infra files, or "review our Terraform". Signals: *.tf, cloudformation/*.yaml, playbooks, k8s manifests, Helm charts, module registries.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Code Review JavaSecurity review of Java code — dangerous sinks and Spring pitfalls. Load when reviewing a Java/ Spring codebase/PR, on .java source in scope, or "review this Java". Signals: pom.xml/build.gradle, Spring/Spring Boot, ObjectInputStream, XML parsers, Runtime.exec, JNDI/lookups.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Code Review MethodologySystematic manual source-code security review — how to find bugs by reading code. Load on "review this code/repo", a source-available target, whitebox testing, or auditing a PR/app for vulnerabilities. Signals: a codebase in scope, "SAST", "secure code review", a language repo.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Code Review NodejsSecurity review of Node.js / JavaScript code — dangerous sinks and Express/framework pitfalls. Load when reviewing a Node/JS codebase/PR, on package.json + Express/Next/Nest, or "review this Node app". Signals: child_process, eval, Function, prototype pollution, JWT, Mongoose/Sequelize.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Code Review PhpSecurity review of PHP code — dangerous sinks and framework pitfalls (Laravel/Symfony/WordPress). Load when reviewing a PHP codebase/PR, on .php source in scope, or "review this PHP". Signals: composer.json, index.php, Laravel/Symfony/WP, unserialize, include/require with variables, mysqli/PDO.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Code Review PythonSecurity review of Python code — dangerous sinks and framework-specific pitfalls (Django/Flask/ FastAPI). Load when reviewing a Python codebase/PR, on .py source in scope, or "review this Python". Signals: requirements.txt/pyproject, Django/Flask/FastAPI, ORMs, pickle/yaml, subprocess.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Code Review RubySecurity review of Ruby code — dangerous sinks and Rails pitfalls. Load when reviewing a Ruby/Rails codebase/PR, on .rb source in scope, or "review this Rails app". Signals: Gemfile, config/routes.rb, ActiveRecord, ERB, YAML.load, send/constantize.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Code Review RustSecurity review of Rust code — where a memory-safe language still has real bugs: `unsafe`, FFI, panics, and the usual injection/logic sinks. Load when reviewing Rust source/PR, on .rs / Cargo.toml in scope, or "review this Rust". Signals: Cargo.toml, unsafe blocks, extern "C", unwrap/expect, actix/axum/rocket handlers.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Code Review Secrets DetectionFind leaked secrets in code, git history, and CI. Load on "secrets", "leaked key", a repo/ git history in scope, exposed .git, CI config review, or public-repo OSINT. Signals: API keys, tokens, .env files, private keys, cloud creds, hardcoded passwords.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Code Review SoliditySecurity review of Solidity / EVM smart contracts — reentrancy, access control, arithmetic, and DeFi economic bugs. Load when reviewing a smart contract / web3 codebase or PR, on .sol source in scope, or "audit this contract". Signals: *.sol, foundry/hardhat, ERC-20/721, external calls, delegatecall, proxy patterns, price oracles.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20
- Crypto Oracle AttacksBreak weak symmetric crypto in real apps — decrypt or forge encrypted tokens/cookies without the key via padding oracles (CBC), ECB block shuffling, and hash-length-extension of homemade MACs. Load when the app hands you ciphertext you can tamper with and resend: an encrypted cookie/token, a "state"/"data" blob, an IV+ciphertext, a `H(secret‖msg)` signature, base64 that changes on edit.Votes: 0GitHub stars: 20