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Grad Dual Process

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Apply dual-process theory to diagnose whether judgments arise from fast intuitive (System 1) or slow analytical (System 2) processing and identify resulting cognitive biases. Use this skill when the user needs to explain why quick decisions go wrong, design choice architectures that account for cognitive defaults, audit decision processes for heuristic errors, or when they ask 'why do people misjudge probability', 'how to reduce snap-judgment errors', or 'when does intuition fail'.

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  • Added May 27, 2026
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SKILL.md
---
name: "grad-dual-process"
description: "Apply dual-process theory to diagnose whether judgments arise from fast intuitive (System 1) or slow analytical (System 2) processing and identify resulting cognitive biases. Use this skill when the user needs to explain why quick decisions go wrong, design choice architectures that account for cognitive defaults, audit decision processes for heuristic errors, or when they ask 'why do people misjudge probability', 'how to reduce snap-judgment errors', or 'when does intuition fail'."
metadata:
  category: "WP-29 心理學理論"
  tags: ["dual-process", "system-1", "system-2", "heuristics", "cognitive-bias", "Kahneman", "thinking-fast-and-slow"]
---

# Dual-Process Theory

## Overview

Dual-process theory (Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich & West, 2000) distinguishes two modes of cognitive processing: System 1 (fast, automatic, heuristic-driven) and System 2 (slow, deliberate, rule-based). Most judgments default to System 1, which is efficient but prone to systematic biases when heuristics misfire.

## When to Use

- Explaining why stakeholders make predictable judgment errors under time pressure or complexity
- Designing decision environments (nudges, checklists) that compensate for System 1 defaults
- Auditing existing processes to identify where heuristic shortcuts introduce risk
- Evaluating when intuitive expertise is reliable vs. when it is misleading

## When NOT to Use

- When decisions are already well-structured with algorithmic procedures (bias is engineered out)
- As an excuse to dismiss all intuitive judgment — expert intuition can be accurate in high-validity environments
- When the problem is motivational rather than cognitive (people know the right answer but choose otherwise)

## Assumptions

```
IRON LAW: System 1 operates by DEFAULT — System 2 engagement
requires cognitive effort and is easily depleted. Under time
pressure, cognitive load, or ego depletion, System 1 dominates
and heuristic biases amplify.
```

Key assumptions:
1. System 1 and System 2 are metaphors for processing modes, not discrete brain systems
2. Heuristics are generally adaptive — biases emerge at the boundary conditions
3. System 2 can override System 1, but only when cued and when cognitive resources are available

## Methodology

### Step 1 — Identify the Judgment or Decision Context

Characterize the decision: time pressure, complexity, familiarity, stakes, emotional involvement.

### Step 2 — Classify Processing Mode

| Feature | System 1 | System 2 |
|---------|----------|----------|
| Speed | Fast, automatic | Slow, effortful |
| Awareness | Unconscious | Conscious |
| Capacity | High (parallel) | Low (serial) |
| Basis | Heuristics, associations | Rules, logic |
| Error type | Systematic biases | Computational mistakes |
| Triggered by | Default, familiarity | Novelty, conflict detection |

### Step 3 — Map Relevant Heuristics and Biases

Common System 1 heuristics and their failure modes:
- **Availability**: judge frequency by ease of recall — biased by salience and recency
- **Representativeness**: judge probability by similarity — ignores base rates
- **Anchoring**: estimate by adjusting from initial value — insufficient adjustment
- **Affect**: judge risk/benefit by emotional reaction — neglects statistical evidence

### Step 4 — Design Intervention

- **De-bias**: slow down decisions, require explicit justification, use pre-mortems
- **Nudge**: restructure choice architecture to align System 1 defaults with desired outcomes
- **Leverage**: use System 1 strengths (pattern recognition) in high-validity, rapid-feedback domains

## Output Format

```markdown
## Dual-Process Analysis: [Context]

### Decision Environment
- Time pressure: [High/Medium/Low]
- Complexity: [High/Medium/Low]
- Emotional involvement: [High/Medium/Low]
- Dominant processing: [System 1 / System 2 / Mixed]

### Heuristic-Bias Map
| Heuristic | Bias Triggered | Evidence | Risk Level |
|-----------|---------------|----------|------------|
| [heuristic] | [bias] | [observation] | [High/Med/Low] |

### Intervention Design
1. [De-biasing or nudge strategy]
2. [Process change]
3. [Environmental redesign]
```

## Gotchas

- System 1/System 2 is a useful metaphor, not a literal brain architecture — avoid reifying the distinction
- Expert intuition (System 1) is highly accurate in domains with clear feedback and regular patterns (e.g., chess, firefighting)
- De-biasing training has poor transfer — changing the environment is more effective than training individuals
- Cognitive depletion effects are debated; do not assume a simple "willpower battery" model
- System 2 is not inherently "better" — it is slower, more costly, and still subject to motivated reasoning
- People often confuse confidence with accuracy; high System 1 confidence does not indicate correctness

## References

- Kahneman, D. (2011). *Thinking, fast and slow*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Stanovich, K. E. & West, R. F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: implications for the rationality debate. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 23(5), 645-665.
- Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. *Science*, 185(4157), 1124-1131.

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  • examples/sample_scenario.md5.8 KB

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