Keep an agent's objective under the operator's control when the agent ingests untrusted content. Separate retrieved data from instructions, refuse tool-scope expansion requested by that data, and confirm sensitive actions against the raw action rather than a summary. Use when building RAG pipelines, email/ticket/doc readers, browser agents, or any planner whose context includes fetched content. Do NOT use for the coding agent's own session hygiene \u2014 that is `injection-defense`.
Installs into .claude/skills of the current project.
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---
name: owasp-asi01-agent-goal-hijack
description: "Keep an agent's objective under the operator's control when the agent ingests untrusted content. Separate retrieved data from instructions, refuse tool-scope expansion requested by that data, and confirm sensitive actions against the raw action rather than a summary. Use when building RAG pipelines, email/ticket/doc readers, browser agents, or any planner whose context includes fetched content. Do NOT use for the coding agent's own session hygiene \u2014 that is `injection-defense`."
metadata:
chock.artifact: rule
chock.enforcement: advise
chock.coverage_without_chock: advisory
---
# OWASP ASI01 — Agent Goal Hijack
Keep an agent's objective under the operator's control when the agent ingests untrusted content. Separate retrieved data from instructions, refuse tool-scope expansion requested by that data, and confirm sensitive actions against the raw action rather than a summary. Use when building RAG pipelines, email/ticket/doc readers, browser agents, or any planner whose context includes fetched content. Do NOT use for the coding agent's own session hygiene — that is `injection-defense`.
```
build(agent): partition(context){trusted: operator_instructions, untrusted: retrieved_content}; never(let untrusted) expand(tool_scope|goal|recipient)
before(sensitive_action): confirm(human, raw_action); see .agents/policies/owasp-asi01-agent-goal-hijack/references/goal-hijack.md
```
This skill is advisory: the client reading it has no mechanism to enforce it, and this policy stays advisory even when compiled by `chock` -- it ships rule text, not a blocking hook. See https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock
