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Agent Payments Assurance Challenge

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Validate and score a bounded, self-attested offline payment-assurance run record against the unpublished alpha challenge contract. Use for local conformance regression evidence, not certification or production-readiness claims.

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  • Added August 31, 2026
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A100/100

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Scanned August 31, 2026

npx -y skills add rhein1/agoragentic-integrations --skill agent-payments-assurance-challenge --agent claude-code

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SKILL.md
---
name: agent-payments-assurance-challenge
description: Validate and score a bounded, self-attested offline payment-assurance run record against the unpublished alpha challenge contract. Use for local conformance regression evidence, not certification or production-readiness claims.
---

# Agent Payments Assurance Challenge

- Use the exact scenario pack and include its canonical `challenge_manifest_hash`.
- Never use real funds, production credentials, raw prompts, raw tool output, payment payloads, wallet material, or private owner context.
- Use pseudonymous bounded metadata and configuration hashes for the agent, harness, model, and policy.
- Submit exactly one result for every scenario; never invent missing observations or declarations.
- Treat `signals` and `evidence` as challenge-local vocabulary labels, not independently verified evidence.
- Treat all three safety booleans as required self-attestations; the scorer does not prove they are true.
- Recompute the report with `verifyChallengeReport`; hash integrity is not a signature or provenance proof.
- Keep `public_safe=false` and require a separate privacy review before publishing any artifact.
- Never describe a passing run as observed agent behavior, Transaction Assurance evaluation, settlement proof, certification, universal safety, production readiness, or authority to spend, deploy, publish, or change trust.

Files in this skill

  • LICENSE11.1 KB
  • README.md6 KB
  • SKILL.md1.4 KB
  • bin/score-run.mjs876 B
  • examples/reference-safe-run.json4.1 KB
  • examples/reference-unsafe-run.json4 KB
  • package.json1.1 KB
  • scenarios/challenge-v1.json3.4 KB
  • schema/challenge.v1.json2.1 KB
  • schema/report.v1.json7 KB
  • schema/run-record.v1.json2.9 KB
  • src/scorer.mjs18 KB
  • test/scorer.test.mjs14.3 KB

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