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---
name: web-business-logic
description: >
Find business-logic flaws — abusing intended functionality in unintended ways. Load on
workflows with money/quantity/state/limits: checkout, coupons, refunds, transfers, quotas,
multi-step flows, role/tenant boundaries. Signals: price/qty params, discount codes, step
skipping, negative/overflow values.
domain: web
type: technique
stability: learning
modes: [bugbounty]
severity: high
owasp: [A04:2021-Insecure-Design]
cwe: [CWE-840, CWE-841]
tools: [burp]
schema_version: 1
---
# Business-logic flaws
## When it applies
The app works "correctly" per code but the *rules* can be gamed: paying less, getting more,
skipping a required step, or crossing a boundary the designers assumed users would respect.
## Why it works
Scanners can't find these — they require understanding intent. Servers trust client-supplied
economics/state and assume the happy path; deviate from it and constraints (price, quantity,
sequence, ownership) aren't re-enforced.
## Method
1. **Model the intended flow** and its invariants (what must stay true: price ≥ 0, step order,
one coupon, my-cart-only).
2. **Break each invariant**:
- **Value tampering**: negative/zero/huge quantity or price, currency/decimal tricks, integer overflow.
- **Coupon/refund abuse**: reuse, stack, apply after total, refund more than paid.
- **Step skipping / state**: jump to the confirmation/paid step, replay a step, reorder.
- **Quota/limit bypass**: race the check (→ `web-race-conditions`), reset counters, parallel requests.
- **Boundary crossing**: act on another tenant's resource (→ `web-idor`), escalate role via workflow.
3. **Quantify impact** in business terms (free goods, money, privilege) for the report.
## Gotchas
- These are context-specific — read the app like a user trying to cheat, not a scanner.
- Prove real impact (an order placed for $0, a limit bypassed), not just an odd response.
- Often chains with IDOR/race/mass-assignment — combine primitives.
## Verify success
A completed abuse of the workflow with concrete gain (paid less/nothing, exceeded a limit,
accessed disallowed state) reproduced step-by-step.
## References
PortSwigger business-logic labs; OWASP WSTG business-logic testing.